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FAVORING JUDICIAL DISCRETION NOT
TANTAMOUNT TO USHERING IN
UNPREDICTABILITY: AN EXPLORATION OF THE

CIRCUIT SPLIT AND A LOOK AT How
THE NINTH CIRCUIT SIDED CORRECTLY AMONG

CERCLA

THE DIVIDE

Lorran Hart Ferguson*
I. INTRODUCTION
When parties are responsible for causing contamination to
sites by exposure to hazardous substances, pollutants, or
Comprehensive
subject to the
are
they
contaminants,
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA") or Superfund. This act was created and
designed to facilitate the effective clean up of contaminated
several parties are responsible for
areas. 1 Frequently,
environmental contamination sites. 2 In these instances, it is
common for one party to undertake the cleanup efforts and then
seek reimbursement from other liable parties. 3
CERCLA states that the pro tanto approach should be
used to allocate responsibility when government parties are liable
in site contaminations. 4 However, CERCLA is silent as to how
amounts that are recovered in settlements among privately
responsible parties ("PRPs") should be credited against the total
damages incurred. In order to function around this silence, courts

*Executive Editor, KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIc. & NAT. RESOURCES L., 2016-2017; B.A.
2014, Lindsey Wilson College; J.D. expected May 2017, University of Kentucky College of
Law.
I See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
2 Michael D. Daneker, 9th Circ. Deepens Split Over Complex CERCLA Sites,
LAW360 (Apr. 22, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/645836/9th-circdeepens-split-over-complex-cercla-sites [https://perma.cc/VBW3-37C8].
-Id.
4 Barry M. Hartman et al., NavigatingCERCLA Settlements in an Age of
Uncertainty:FalloutFrom Ameripride Services v. Texas Eastern Overseas, 45 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10846, 10850 (2015).
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typically turn to two different approaches involving tort liability
in order to determine allocation: the pro tanto approach and the
proportionate share approach.5
For several years, the First and Seventh Circuits have
been at odds regarding the proper settlement method when less
than all jointly and severally liable parties have settled.6 The
entrance of the Ninth Circuit this year has further deepened the
already-established circuit split.7 The First and Ninth Circuits
favor discretion for federal district courts in selecting the
appropriate method of settlement credit, while the Seventh
Circuit favors the pro tanto approach. 8 Additionally, Texas
Eastern Overseas, Inc.-the defendant in the case, which when
decided by the Ninth Circuit injected that court into the
discussion as an ally of the First Circuit-championed the
proportionate share approach, which has yet to be adopted by any
circuit.9
As the Supreme Court of the United States has yet to
grant certiorarifor a case of this nature, the circuit split is a
notable issue that may only become more complicated in the
coming years if the divide continues to grow and the Supreme
10
Court continues to deny certiorari.
The split hinges on one
important question: which allocation method is most in-line with
congressional
intent
and
subsequently
the
appropriate
compliment to the standards
established by CERCLA?
Ultimately, until the Supreme Court rules on the matter, it is
important for settling parties to keep in mind that rules relating
to settlement credits do differ from one jurisdiction to another."
Among the approaches presented by the different
jurisdictions, the method adopted by the First and Ninth Circuits
stands to have the most effective implementation. Their approach
allows for judicial discretion to establish the most effective
method of allocation in these often-complicated situations.
Contrary to arguments by opponents, this method is also capable

5 Id.

6 Id.; see generallyAkzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d
302 (7th
Cir. 1999); Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004).
7 Hartman et al., supra note 4.
8 Id.

9Id.

10 Id.
11 Id.
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of still creating a stable method for parties to assess their
potential liability, as courts can hold pre-negotiation hearings to
establish which method of allocation will be implemented in each
specific case.
This note will discuss the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act and will explore its
functions in Section II. It will also explore the different methods
of liability allocation, which different parties have viewed as the
appropriate means of liability allocation for PRPs under the act,
including the pro tanto approach and the proportionate share
approach. Section III will discuss the current circuit split
regarding multiparty liability in cleanup sites, and how the
Seventh, Ninth, and First Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled
on the issue. Section III will also include the proposed method of
allocation presented by Texas Eastern Overseas. Finally, Section
IV will outline my recommended stance for courts to take in the
future: the courts should view CERCLA's lack of explicit
language governing instances involving private parties, as their
intention to treat private parties differently from governmental
parties whose actions are explicitly guided. In the future, courts
should thus adopt the approach favored by the First and Ninth
Circuit Courts.
II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT

The
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
and
1980,
in
Compensation, and Liability Act was enacted
provides a federal fund to clean up hazardous or abandoned sites,
spills, or any related releases of contamination into the
environment.1 2 Due to the financial nature of CERCLA and the
large monetary fund that it provides for cleanup purposes, it is
often also referred to simply as "Superfund." 13 The
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is authorized to
implement CERCLA in all fifty states and has the authority to

12 Summary of the ComprehensiveEnvironmental Response, Compensation, and
LiabilityAct (Superfund), EPA, http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summarycomprehensive -environmental-response-compensation-and-liability-act (last visited Jan.
11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Z494-54GS].
13 Id.
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pursue responsible parties and force their cooperation in the
cleanup processes.14
It is a common occurrence for multiple parties to be liable
for portions of site contamination, and CERCLA imposes joint
and several liability upon the parties responsible.1 5 The circuit
split at issue concerns private parties' settlements at sites with
multiparty liability as governed by the act. 16 Typically, the EPA
will target only one of the responsible parties, and that party will
fund the work to repair the site at issue. CECRLA then
authorizes that party to seek contribution from other liable
parties for the costs incurred during remediation of the damage
to the site at issue.1 7 The circuit split arises as courts have
addressed situations where some of the responsible parties settle
regarding their liability to the remediating party. Courts are then
tasked with dividing the remaining liability among responsible
parties who have yet to settle their share of the responsibility in
relation to the site.18
Regarding the division of liability in situations involving
PRPs, CERCLA "is silent with respect to how amounts recovered
in settlements should be credited against the total damages," and
courts are tasked with deciding which method of allocation of
liabilities is most appropriate.1 9 The Seventh Circuit applies the
pro tanto approach to allocation as outlined in the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA"). 20 The First and
Ninth Circuits allow for judicial discretion in determining which
method of allocation to apply. Additionally, some parties,
including Texas Eastern Overseas, champion application of the
proportionate share approach as established under the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA").

14

1s
16
17

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2002); Hartman et al., supranote 4.
Hartman et al., supra note 4.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607; Hartman et al., supra note 4.

18 Hartman et al., supra note 4.
19 Id.
20

Lynn T. Manolopoulos, Non-Settling CERCLA Defendants Beware: Ninth
CircuitProvides Lower Courts with Discretion to Allocate Liability Using Equitable
Factors, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.energyenvironmentallaw.com/ 2015/04/15/non-settling-cercla-defendantsbeware-ninth-circuit-provides-lower-courts-with-discretion-to-allocate-liability-usingequitable-factors [https://perma.cc/5B9T-FTBH].
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A. The Pro Tanto Approach
The pro tanto approach is the method for settling the
issues adopted by UCATA. 21 Under UCATA, when an injured
party settles with one or more other liable parties who are also
responsible for the same contamination site, "the settlement does
not discharge the non-settling tortfeasors, but reduces the injured
party's claims against them by the dollar value of the
settlement." 22 Thus, under this approach, if a liable party settles
for less than their share liability of the site contamination costs,
in the end the non-settling parties will pay more than their
proportionate share. 23 Said another way, under this approach,
"[a] litigating defendant's liability will frequently differ from its
equitable share, because a settlement with one defendant for less
than its equitable share requires the non-settling defendant to
pay more than its share." 24
This approach, in effect, encourages parties to settle early,
whereas parties who do not settle early end up litigating over the
portion of the total damages that have not been recovered
through settlements. 25 Some scholars argue that this approach
"creates an incentive for unfair or collusive settlements whereby
parties settling early are left off the hook for much less than their
relative share. This is because those costs can then be recovered
from other non-settling parties later in litigation. 26
Essentially, one fear concerning this approach is that the
parties who settle first will have the incentive to not take their
fair share of responsibility when accepting liability. Concerns
arise, fearing that such parties will settle and consequently bar
themselves from further liability, thus sometimes leaving the
bulk of liability to other parties who arrive at the negotiating
table at a later time. It is a concern that this approach, while
encouraging early settlement, may also penalize parties who do
take initiative to settle early but still fail to be the first party to
settle.

21 Id.
22
28
21

AmeriPride Servs. v. Tex. E. Overseas, Inc., 782 F.3d 474, 484 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id.
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 212 (1994).

z Hartman et al., supra note 4.
26

Id.
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In order to combat issues regarding fair allocation of
liabilities, some courts adopting the pro tanto approach mandate
that parties partake in a "good faith hearing" prior to the
approval of negotiated settlements to determine if the
agreements reached allocate the fair share or responsibility to the
settling party.27
Under CERCLA, the pro tanto approach is required in
settlements that involve government parties who share part of
the liability for the damage or contamination of sites. 28 However,
CERCLA does not explicitly extend this requirement for the use
of the pro tanto approach to instances that involve only PRPs. 29
B. The ProportionateShare Approach
Another approach for determining the amount of parties'
liabilities is the proportionate share approach, which was adopted
by the UCFA. 30 Under this approach, the value of the injured
party's claim against the remaining parties that share
responsibility is "reduced not by the dollar amount of the
settlement, but instead by the settling party's relative share of
liability." 31 Courts are required to determine the liability of the
settled parties in relation to the non-settling parties when using
the proportionate share approach, and then to subtract the
proportional share from the total damages at issue in the case. 3 2
Thus, this approach is not concerned with the actual settled
amount. 33 Ultimately, this method protects non-settling parties in
a way that the pro tanto approach does not. 34 While under the pro
tanto approach, parties who do not settle or are the last to settle
are sometimes strapped with more than their proportionate share
of the costs, but under the proportionate share approach parties
are only liable for their proportional share of the total damages at
issue.

2

Id.

28

Id.

29 Id.
3

Manolopoulos, supra note 20.

31 Hartman et al., supra note 4.

Id.
a Id.
3 Id.
32
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CONCERNING MULTIPARTY LIABILITY

A. The Seventh Circuit's View
The Seventh Circuit has set its own standard regarding
the allocation of liability in multi-party cleanup sites. The court
outlined its views regarding appropriate allocation in, Akzo Nobel
Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.35 Decided in 1999, the case resulted
after Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. and the O'Brien Corporation
(hereinafter "Akzo") sued Aigner Corporation, who according to
the court, was standing in for approximately fifty other firms also
responsible at the waste site. 36 At the time of the action, Aigner
was responsible for a large portion of the cleanup activities on the.
site, which all parties involved in the suit, were somewhat
responsible for. 37 Akzo had also performed some more minor
cleanup work, but had only done so in the area of the site of
which it conceded it was responsible for damage.3 8
Akzo brought suit demanding that Aigner contribute to
the cost of cleanup in the small portion of the cleanup site in
which Akzo had assisted with cleanup efforts. 39 Aigner
counterclaimed that Akzo should reimburse Aigner regarding the
area for which Aigner had been primarily responsible. 40 The court,
ultimately ruled that Akzo was to compensate Aigner for 12.56
percent of the total efforts it would incur on the contamination
site, consequently, rejecting Akzo's argument that Akzo was only
responsible for a small part of the waste site and bore no
responsibility for the burden of costs for any other site areas. 41 In
rejecting Akzo's argument, the district court concluded that it is
impossible to track pollutants from their destinations back to
their original sources in this particular waste site. 42 The trial
court ordered Akzo to pay an additional award of $1.5 million
dollars, equaling the sum equivalent to the costs incurred at the

'a

Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 197 F.3d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1999).

: Id.
3 Id. at 303-04.
31 Id. at 303.
a Id. at 304.
40 Id.
41 Id.

2 Id.
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time of trial minus what Akzo had already spent. 43 Overall, Akzo
generated about nine percent of the total solvents spilled on the
site, yet the trial court ordered Akzo to pay Aigner for
approximately thirteen percent of the total costs that Aigner had
incurred or would incur in seeking completion of the cleanup. 4 4
Akzo then appealed the judgment to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 4 5 At the Seventh
Circuit, Akzo asked the court to hold that it owed no damages to
Aigner or related parties. 46 Akzo also contended that if it were in
fact responsible for any portion of the costs, it should only be
responsible for nine percent of the total cleanup costs, as Akzo
was responsible for nine percent of the processed solvents that
contaminated the site. 47
The district court held that the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act required the court to disregard the responsibilities of
non-parties when determining the total financial liabilities of
parties involved in suits.48 However, the Seventh Circuit rejected
this idea. The court felt that it would create a process in which
the party who initially agreed to take the case could essentially
turn a large profit on the spill site, or that if the party who took
initial responsibility were capped and prohibited from profiting,
then the other parties would not share their fair proportion of
liability. 49
The court gives what it asserts as a simple example of the
idea championed by the lower court by stating the following:
Suppose Firm A is responsible for 40% of the
pollutants, Firm B for 10%, and Firm C for 50%.
Firm A agrees with the EPA to perform the
cleanup and sues B for contribution. On the
district court's reading of the UCFA, B must pay
20% of the total cleanup costs, because B sent 20%
of the pollutants that A and B generated jointly.50

43

Id.

" Id. at 305.
4 See id. at 304.
46
4

Id.
Id.

8 Id. at 306.
4 Id.
50 Id.
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The court continues to explain that C is never factored into this
equation; the fact that C is able to pay its share, and does pay its
share, is never considered.5 1 If C does pay its full fifty percent
share, then A will only bear thirty percent of the burden of
contamination costs, while they are responsible for forty percent
of the pollutants. 52 Thus, the court concluded that by being the
original party to agree to take control of the cleanup efforts in
multiparty contamination litigation a party has the potential to
make a profit from its efforts, if the statute is read in light of the
district court's view. 5 3 The Seventh Circuit rejected the trial
court's choice of the UCFA's proportional share approach as the
appropriate method of allocation.5 4
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the argument presented
by Akzo. 5 5 Akzo asserted that the UCFA requires a "global
assessment" by the district court; thus, Akzo is not required to
pay anything until all shares of liability are determined.5 6 The
court found issues with this method because it would take years
to resolve.5 7 Akzo further asserted that it could pay its nine
percent and then be free from further liability, as this was the
total amount for which it was responsible. 58 The court also
rejected this argument, as it fails to consider the outcome for
some parties if other responsible parties backed out. For example,
Aigner and similarly situated parties would be strapped with
responsibility far exceeding their proportion, all because they
took initiative in helping to guide the cleanup process. 5 9
The court considered, but rejected, the plan of allocation
established under UCFA and instead favored the pro tanto
approach as the appropriate method of allocating responsibility in
these situations. 60 This pro tanto approach is the same one
already in use for claims arising involving government parties

51 Id.
2 Id.
53 Id.

5 Id.
5 Id.
Id.

57 Id.
5 Id.
59 Id.
( Id.
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under §113(f)(2) of CERCLA.6 1 The court stated, "Extending the
pro tanto approach of §113(f)(2) to claims under §113(f)(1) enables
the district court to avoid what could be a complex and
unproductive inquiry into the responsibility of missing parties." 62
Thus, ultimately, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that district courts are required to use the pro tanto
approach. 63 This approach creates several implications for both
settling and non-settling parties, including parties with only a
small portion of liability that may now face collateral attacks
from other responsible parties. While this approach opens the
possibility of collateral attacks by other parties, there is a sense
of stability that is presented in the Seventh Circuit's approach. It
is possible that parties may be sued by others under this method,
but the parties facing potential litigation will at least know that
the possibility of suit is present and will be prepared to take
appropriate action. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the
district court must determine the total amount Aigner collected
from third parties in settlements, and then required Akzo to pay
12.56 percent of that total amount recovered. 64 Additionally, this
total must be "reduced not only by collections Aigner has realized
to date, but also by future third-party payments."6 5
Under the First and Ninth Circuit's view, the parties could
still be subjected to the pro tanto approach if the court deems it
appropriate. While both sides of the split could reach an outcome
that applies the pro tanto approach, the Seventh Circuit's view
provides the ability of parties to always know they will function
under the pro tanto method, rather than face an uncertain
method of allocation. Thus, the Seventh Circuit has created a
bright-line rule.
It is also important to note that only parties who have a
small portion of liability may face these collateral attacks.6 6 This
is a positive implication of the Seventh Circuit's approach: only
some parties experience the ultimate uncertainty that is a known
possibility.6 7 A negative outcome, however, is that parties that

61 Id.
62

Id.

* Hartman et al., supra note 4.
6 Akzo, 197 F.3d at 308.
65 Id.
66Id

67 Hartman et al., supra note 4.

2016-2017

FAVORING JUDICIAL DISCRETION

135

did not greatly contribute to site contamination may be saddled
with additional lawsuits. While this approach may not subject
major parties to collateral lawsuits, it does not afford smaller
parties the same protection.68
B. The Firstand Ninth Circuits'View
The First and Ninth Circuits have ruled similarly to one
another regarding the allocation of liability in multiparty cleanup
sites.69 These two circuits have granted discretion to district
courts, allowing them to apply the method strategy that they find
"equitable in the circumstances" of each case.7 0 Discretion is
given to the courts to decide whether to apply the pro tanto
approach, the proportionate share approach, or another judicially
selected approach.7 1
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in its 2015 ruling
in AmeriPride Services, Inc. v. Texas Eastern Overseas, Inc.7 2 In
that case, the court ruled that under CERCLA § 113(f)(1), courts
have discretion to determine, based on the facts of each specific
case, which method is most appropriate. 73 In deciding which
approach to implement in AmeriPride, the Ninth Circuit
considered what effect the settlement by a portion of responsible
parties would have on the liability of non-settling responsible
parties.

7

The Ninth Circuit also instructed the lower court to "allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines appropriate."7 5
AmeriPride concerned the Ninth Circuit's review of the
lower court's ruling determining if the methods for calculating
and allocating responsibility under CERCLA were correct.7 6 The
case arose concerning the contamination of groundwater and soil
in Sacramento, California.7 7 The contaminated site was originally

68 Id.
69 Id.

7o Id.
71 Id.
72 AmeriPride Servs. v. Tex. E. Overseas, Inc., 782 F.3d 474 (9th Cir. 2015).
73 Id.

74 Daneker, supra note 2.
75 AmeriPride, 782 F.3d at
76 Id. at 479.

77

Id. at 480.

486.
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owned by Valley Industrial Services, Inc. ("VIS"), but was later
purchased by AmeriPride while also having several other owners
take possession of the land between their respective ownerships.
During its ownership of the site, VIS released the hazardous
substance perchloroethylene ("PCE"), which it used in its dry
cleaning operations, into the environment. Eventually, Texas
Eastern merged with VIS and, in doing so, assumed the liabilities
of VIS.
Once AmeriPride took on ownership of the location, more
water contaminated with PCE was released into the groundwater
and soil. The contamination at the site owned by AmeriPride
eventually moved into neighboring grounds and led to the
contamination of groundwater wells owned by the CaliforniaAmerican Water Company. 7 AmeriPride ultimately reported
their findings of contamination, and eventually the state gained
control of the site's investigation.79 Once under state supervision,
AmeriPride continued to investigate the hazardous situation and
took steps to remediate the contamination of the groundwater
and soil surrounding the site.8 0
In 2000, AmeriPride sued Texas Eastern, VIS, and two
other companies in district court in an attempt to recover the
costs corresponding to the contamination resulting from the
release of PCE.8 1 The two other parties settled with AmeriPride,
while Texas Eastern filed a counterclaim on behalf of its interests
as owner of both itself and VIS.82 Additionally, the parties in
neighboring locations, California-American Water Company, and
Huhtamaki Foodservices, Inc., both sought recovery from
AmeriPride for their costs incurred while responding to the
contamination and additional, related damages. 8 3 AmeriPride
eventually settled with both California-American Water and
Huhtamaki Foodservices for $2 million and $8.25 million,
respectively. 84

8Id. at 480-81.
19 Id. at 481.

8o Id.
81 Id.
82

Id.

83 Id.
84 Id.
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Prior to trial, the district court held that Texas Eastern
was liable for AmeriPride's response costs. 85 It also concluded

that the settlement costs AmeriPride incurred when settling with
the other two parties involved were not encompassed under the
statute it originally cited but that AmeriPride's complaint could
be amended to include request of recovery of these costs from
Texas Eastern under a different section of CERCLA. 86
After trial, the district court concluded that TEO was
liable to AmeriPride.8 7 It found that AmeriPride had incurred
$15,508,912 worth of damages that could be equitably
apportioned between AmeriPride and Texas Eastern.8 8 To reach
this number, the court totaled AmeriPride's response costs and
then deducted the total amounts paid in the settlements by theother parties. 89 Under this formula, the $18,758,912 total
response costs were then reduced by the $3.25 million
AmeriPride received as a result of settling claims with the other
two parties, making the total cost $15,508,912.90 The district
court then divided this amount equally between AmeriPride and
Texas Eastern.9 1
Texas Eastern Overseas ultimately sought review by the
Ninth Circuit and asserted four arguments on appeal. 92 The first
section of Texas Eastern's argument was the most relevant to
this topic. It asserted that the higher court should find fault in
the method chosen by the lower court to determine the allocation
of liability among the parties involved. 93 The Ninth Circuit
ultimately reviewed the statute under a de novo standard of
review.94

The court considered whether it would be appropriate to
apply federal common law to determine the appropriate
interpretation of the statue at hand.9 5 They ultimately concluded
that it could not "read federal common law into a statute if [they]

8"

Id. at 482.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
- Id.
Id.
92 Id. at 479.

93 Id.

9 Id. at 483.
95 Id. at 485-86.
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determine[d] it [was] contrary to congressional intent."9 6 The
court then explained that before it reaches the point of applying
federal common law, it is first important to determine if Congress
has answered the question at issue. 9 7 The court importantly
referred to a prior ruling with regards to CERCLA, while it
"presume[s] the application of well-established common law
principles to a federal statute, this presumption does not apply
'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."' 98
Congressional intent, it concluded, can be deduced from the
language of the statute, the structure of the statute, the
relationship that is present between the provisions of the statute,
and the overall purpose of the statute.9 9
With regard to the statutory language in question with
CERCLA, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statute for
settlements involving only private, potentially responsible parties
failed to specify the appropriate allocation method. Congress did
not intend to impose a uniform requirement in such situations
and instead desired to give the courts involved greater
discretion. 100 The court pointed out that there were specific
provisions of CERCLA, which stated that the pro tanto approach
must be used in situations involving government parties, and
that lack of such a provision concerning PRPs meant that
Congress did not intend to apply solely the pro tanto approach to
those situations.10 1
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit heavily relied on the
First Circuit's ruling in Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, thus creating
the faction of the two courts on the side favoring judicial
discretion in these proceedings. 102 As the Ninth Circuit aligned
with the First Circuit, the court also specifically rejected the
ruling by the Seventh Circuit in Akzo Nobel Coatings, which
further broadened the circuit divide.10 3

9 Id. at 485.
9 Id. at 486-87.
9 Id. at 486 (citing Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys., 710 F.3d 946, 958 (9th
Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Tex., 507 U.S. 529, 534, (1993))).
9 Id. (citing Chubb, 710 F.3d at 960-61).
10e Manolopoulos, supranote 20.
1t Id.
102 Hartman et al., supra note 4; Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano,
381 F.3d 6 (1st Cir.
2004).
to3 Hartman et al., supra note 4.
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Cyanamid concerned the American Cyanamid Company
("Cyanamid") and Rohm and Haas Company ("R&H") versus
Daniel J. Capuano, Jr., Jack Capuano, and United States
Sanitation, Inc., and Capuano Enterprises. Cyanamid and R&H
disposed of hazardous waste and then sought judgment against
others who were involved with the cleanup site.1 04 The issue
began when Warren Picillo and his wife agreed to allow a portion
of their pig farm to be used for disposal of "drummed and bulk
waste." 0 5 Within a year's time, thousands of barrels of waste
cumulated at the site and eventually caused a giant explosion
that spread throughout the entire farm. The flames lasted for
days and caused Rhode Island authorities to investigate the
situation. Upon investigation, they uncovered "large trenches and
pits filled with free-flowing, multi-colored, pungent liquid
wastes." 0 6 Rhode Island, with the help of the federal government,
initiated a clean up of the area. 0 7
Rhode Island brought an action against thirty-five
defendants in 1983 under CERCIA to recover cleanup costs at
the contamination site. 0 8 These thirty-five defendants included
parties who owned or operated the site or allegedly produced,
transported, or scheduled transportation of waste to the Picillo's
farm. 109 Twenty of the defendants settled with the state,
including the Capuano brothers, who settled their portion for
$500,000. Rhode Island then proceeded to seek judgment against
five of the remaining defendants in trial. 110 Among these five
defendants was R&H."'i The district court concluded that R&H,
as well as two of the other companies sued as defendants at trial,
were jointly and severally liable for $991,937 in costs, which had
yet to be reimbursed along with the total future costs of removal
or remediation that would be incurred by the state.112
R&H later brought a contribution action against the
Capuanos and fifty-one other PRPs seeking reimbursement for
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past and future response costs. 1 13 The district court ultimately
concluded that the Capuanos were liable for one hundred percent
of the waste deposited at the Picillo farm.11 4 Additionally, it
concluded that the Capuanos were "liable for a share of the waste
dumped at the Picillo site as arrangers [and] liable as
transporters for 7.94 percent of the total waste delivered" to the
location. 1 5 The trial court also found that R&H was liable for
3.23 percent of the waste." 6
When the district court determined the proper allocation
of liability among responsible parties, the court did not look at
the fault of non-parties to the suit as the parties present in the
suit failed to present evidence to the court concerning these nonparties' liability." 7 The Capuanos appealed arguing that the
district court was incapable of determining the proper allocation
of costs unless it weighed the shares of all PRPs, even if some of
them were non-parties without evidence presented against
them.118

The district court applied the pro tanto approach, and
subtracted the $382,807 that R&H received via settlements, and
concluded that R&H paid a total of $4,253,918 to the federal
government for cleanup expenses.11 9 As the court had already
concluded that R&H's liability at the site was 3.23 percent, it
determined R&H's total liability was $1,602,080.120 This then left
the Capuano's liable for $2,651,838, which was the total amount,
which R&H paid beyond their share of contamination liability.121
The Capuano brothers then argued that the lower court was
incorrect in determining their liability. Instead, the court should
have determined the amounts based on a pro-rata share of
liability among the PRPs who had settled, instead of taking
R&H's costs and subtracting the amount R&H was truly
responsible for in order to determine Capuano's costS. 12 2
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Upon review, the First Circuit concluded that CERCLA
permits private parties "to seek contribution from non-settling
parties, but unlike a settlement with the United States or a state,
CERCLA does not instruct a court as to how a settlement
agreement between two private parties affects the contribution of
liability of non-settling parties."123 Instead, the First Circuit
determined that CERCLA permits the lower courts to allocate
liability among responsible parties via factors the lower court
sees as equitable.1 24 The First Circuit views the provisions of
CERCLA applicable to PRPs to mean that the district courts have
been given discretion to choose which method they deem most
appropriate in accounting for parties who have or are settling.125
While the First Circuit does not conclude that the pro<
tanto approach is the required method of application, it
ultimately concluded that the district court was permitted to
allow this form of allocation. 126 It stated "[wle believe the district
court did not abuse its discretion by applying the pro tanto
approach given the circumstances of this case" (emphasis
added).127 Its reference to the "circumstances of this case" further
represents its view that the lower court has the ability to choose
the appropriate method in light of the facts of each case.
C. Texas Eastern Overseas'sProposedAllocation Method
In the Ninth Circuit Case, Texas Eastern Overseas argued
that the court should formulate an entirely new rule from those
developed in the Seventh or First Circuits. This approach
championed by Texas Eastern Overseas would apply the
proportionate share method of allocation in instances where
CERCLA is not explicit as to what approach should be applied.1 28
This approach removes the incentive for parties to settle
early and for less than their share of liability for the specific site
contamination.1 2 9 Here, the value of the injured party's claim
against the other parties that are responsible is reduced by the
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settling party's relative share of the responsibility, not the dollar
amount of the settlement.13 0 One negative aspect to this proposed
approach is that under this method the party who originally
undertakes the responsibility of remediation would face an
increased burden.
D. The Future of the CircuitSplit Over CERCLA and Its
Allocation Methods
As of today, the United State Supreme Court has yet to
grant certiorarito hear this issue. With two courts siding on one
side of the issue, another court ruling in a different way, and
several other possible outcomes that could still be applied, it is
most likely that the court will eventually grant certiorarito settle
this issue and establish a more uniform plan of allocation in
contamination sites.
In the future, if the Supreme Court does grant certiorari,
there are several ways it could rule on the issue. The high court
could favor the approach followed by the Ninth and First Circuits,
which provides courts with more flexibility, as it allows the court
to apply the approach they deem most appropriate for each
situation.131 It is also possible that the Supreme Court would
adopt a rule that allows only one method of allocation. Under this
type of approach, it could adopt the rule of the Seventh Circuit
and apply the pro tanto approach or they could adopt the
recommended plan of Texas Eastern Overseas and apply the
proportionate share approach.132
IV. RECOMMENDED OUTCOME

If the United States Supreme Court were to grant
certiorari, it would benefit future parties if it implemented the
approach adopted by the First and Ninth Circuits. The statutory
language argument of the Ninth Circuit is persuasive. It is
essentially an assertion of expressio unius est exclusion alterius,
or the idea that if one class is explicitly mentioned, those not
included were purposefully excluded. Likewise, the court
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reasoned that because CERCLA established explicit guidelines
for allocation involving government parties, but fails to provide
any guidelines for allocation involving PRPs, Congress likely
desired to not establish a uniform guideline for situations with
PRPs. 133 Thus, if Congress had sought to establish a specific
standard for situations involving PRPs, then they would have
established these guidelines as they did in other situations. 134
It is also true that these situations concerning site cleanup
can be very complicated. There are sometimes hundreds of liable
parties involved. Circumstances will also arise when only a few
parties will be involved. Due to the fact that these instances
differ from case to case, and priorities and needs will change
depending on the number of parties involved or the difficulty of
cleaning up the site, it can be very helpful for the court to be able'
to tailor their approach towards each specific situation. It is
evident from the three cases arising in this instance that there
are an unlimited number of fact patterns that could arise under
this statute's governing power, each of which may have different
needs to be addressed by courts.
Opponents of this approach may argue that the lack of
predictability and consistency across jurisdictions could lead to
chaos in settlements. However, pre-negotiation hearings to
establish which approach will be used in each specific case could
provide stability in each instance.
V. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, this legal problem is one that will not
evaporate on its own overtime. As time progresses, it will become
more likely that other United States Circuit Courts will need to
weigh in on this issues presented. If the divide continues, it will
best be resolved by a United States Supreme Court decision
outlining a clear vision for how this statute is intended to
operate. The high court will undoubtedly consider all the
possibilities available for interpretation of the statute. It is
important that in order to preserve legislative authority, the
Supreme Court should side with the Ninth and First Circuits,
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and establish a uniform method of allocation that looks to the
clear intent of the statute itself. Hopefully, the court will view the
omission of an explicit standard for situations involving PRPs,
when paired with the inclusion of a standard for governmental
parties, as a purposeful omission. Granting the courts the
discretion to choose which approach is most appropriate for each
situation will create a system where the complex clean up
processes and parties taking responsibility for them will receive
treatment best tailored to their specific situation.1 35 While some
would argue that a standard rule could be an effective approach
in this instance, it is also important to note that in complicated
situations concerning the clean up of hazardous sites, situations
may be handled more effectively if courts are able to choose the
allocation process based on the type and number of parties
involved.
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